Preliminary Thoughts on Experimental Philosophy

I had heard of experimental philosophy (x-phi) before now, but I did not really think or read much about it until my new philosopher friend, Victor, brought it up.  I remember being in graduate school in philosophy when this movement was getting started.  The school I was enrolled in at the time was already on the forefront of mixing phi of mind with cognitive science–at the time they just called it an “interdisciplinary program” at Georgia State University, I think.  I remember they had just hired Eddy Nahmias, and at the time it was a big deal.  They also brought in big timers like Ned Block to give lectures, so it was a very influential time...well, for me at least.   

I am, of course, very interested in how people can come to some argumentative agreement or consensus, since it might be critical in a functioning democracy. Enter x-phi: a basic premise of this wide ranging "style" of philosophy is to use empirical methods to resolve disagreement in philosophy which cannot be resolved in the "usual framework" of philosophical debate (which itself is unclear and disputed: reason, logic, intuition? what should we appeal to? what will "show" the truth?).

So to simplify what experimental philosophy does: use empirical research to illuminate or "see" how intuitions of folk or experts hold up in making progress on philosophical issues, especially where precisely those "intuitions" or philosophical concepts are at an impasse. Of course, some could conclude, through the empirical research, that human intuitions are flawed, noisy, biased, or too culturally relativistic to be of any import (this is called the "negative program").

X-phi can get confusing, precisely in the sense that labeling a new “kind” of philosophy that uses experimental/empirical methods brings up the older controversy of the ‘crowding out effect:”  where science just replaces “natural philosophy.”  However, x-phi is still philosophy: what is being challenged in x-phi are the very high conceptual analyses and disagreements that perplex “ordinary thinking,” in which both science and philosophy churn out in contemporary discourse.  The problem with modern science is the view that scientists must be neutral about the deeper questions: well, what is quantum reality, what is time? "Shut up and calculate!" Moreover, there is also a commonly believed presupposition that science and philosophy are clearly distinct in the way the former is precise and practical (has utility) and the latter is not.

I am not convinced that either philosophy or science should be generally defined prima facie as: “a human endeavor to be of utility.”  It could be argued that no scientific endeavor at the moment of development is ever thought of as only being “for a purpose of utility.” Obviously, it depends on the type of science, but many would see the very idea of scientific funding for a preconceived purpose as a potential corruption of the method:  i.e. an oil company or pharmaceutical company funding a particular research program.  The goals, normatively and epistemically speaking, are supposed to be aimed at truth.  The argument comes from the longer epistemological debate (knowledge) as to why truth is also efficacious:  but if it is, then whatever eventual “utility” goal that you value, then knowing the truth (scientific truth or philosophical truth, if there is a difference), will give you the “tools” to achieve whatever goal you may have as a society.  For example:  developing COVID vaccines had a clear utility purpose; but, how was the research aimed?  I would argue, first, towards the truth.  I cannot develop the product if I don't know what is true about a “particular question” - like “how does a virus work?” (I am putting aside issues about “how science knows?,” or what “is the scientific method?” - falsification, etc., let’s just say that whatever “theory of truth”, pragmatic, or otherwise, seems to “aim at truth”). 

So, the binary opposition/definition of science vs. philosophy as utility vs. pure speculation is not clearly warranted. There is no clear reason why “sting theory” has any utility to society or individual lives, other than the hope that it can gives us a true Unified Theory of Everything: (There is the joke about why theoretical physics can get funding even though it has no obvious use - because all you need to fund for are dry-erase boards and erasers...Philosophy is even cheaper because philosophers don't need erasers!)  So, “Uses” are just being developed for quantum theory…computers, etc. This is because truth is efficacious. Right? 

Back to the first question: why are philosophical conceptions incompatible and unresolvable?  Who is right?  If rational, logical arguments can’t resolve it, then what else can?  Intuitions! How do we know if intuitions are right, if traditional philosophy can’t?? …well, the empirical method! How do we know the empirical method is valid?  O crap.. Vicious circle again. Hence, the continued tension within x-phi (and meta-philosophy) as to the very validity of x-phi. Of course, this is the very nature of philosophy: to question even the question or method (and perhaps why people get frustrated with philosophy and just say "science or religion/faith is the answer...but therefore presuppose their own uncritical assumptions). So the history of x-phi could be placed alongside the history of Method, in general: hermeneutics, reflective equilibrium...

Next up: X-phi and the Philosophy of Time (or Space-Time, since you can't separate?)...